The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds

The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds represents a new wave of interest in ‘the metaphysical Kant’. In recent decades Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind”. The contributors to this volume share a common commitment to the idea that Kant’s philosophy cannot be properly understood without careful attention to its metaphysical presuppositions and, in particular, to how those metaphysical presuppositions are compatible with Kant’s critique of more “dogmatic” forms of metaphysical thought. The authors approach Kant’s thought from a wide variety of different perspectives – emphasizing not just the familiar Leibnizian background to Kant’s metaphysics, but also its broadly Aristotelian underpinnings and its relationship with metaphysical themes in post-Kantian German Idealism. Similarly, although most of the essays in this volume relate in some way to the familiar question of how best to interpret Kant’s transcendental idealism, they also deal with a wide range of other topics, including Kant’s modal metaphysics, his views on the continuum, his epistemology of the a priori, and the foundations of his “metaethical” views.